Kennedy organized his remarks around three core recommendations, framed as critiques of existing practices of racial liberalism and racial justice. First, racial liberals must exercise greater restraint in choosing when to press allegations of racial discrimination. While it is true, he acknowledged, that allegations of racial discrimination are too frequently dismissed in the American legal system, racial liberals still ought not be quick to draw inferences of racial discrimination from the fact of racial disparity. Recent work connecting mass incarceration in the US with disparities in sentencing directed towards the use of crack as opposed to powder cocaine, for instance, draws the inference between sentencing disparities and racial discrimination too quickly, Kennedy argued. 

Second, racial liberals ought to seek alternative frameworks for characterizing the pursuit of racial justice besides the one of remedying racial discrimination. Drawing on Derrick Bell’s interest convergence thesis, Kennedy argued that racial justice is best pursued in areas where White and Black interests overlap. At some points, he seemed to suggest that this claim was fundamentally one about the nature of justice itself: for instance, a significant proportion of those who experience and suffer from police misconduct are White, so activists who focus solely on its impact on Black communities miss a significant part of the problem. At other points, Kennedy seemed to be making a realist argument about the necessity of building coalitions around shared interests to pursue political aims in a democracy.

Finally, racial liberals ought to more vigorously defend freedom of expression, even for those with odious or bigoted views. Kennedy argued that they should heed the example of Thurgood Marshall, who in his work with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, sought to legally defend the civil liberties of Joseph Beauharnais, a White man who faced legal sanction under an Illinois “group vilification” statute for distributing racist pamphlets in Chicago. Moreover, a commitment to free speech for the pursuit of racial justice means that, in higher education, speakers ought not be banned, professors ought not automatically be sanctioned for using racial epithets in classrooms, nor DEI statements be mandatory prerequisites for academic hiring.

Kennedy concluded his lecture with some remarks on racial liberalism’s political sensibility. Perhaps most importantly, racial liberalism involves a commitment to “advancing its cause pursuant to means constrained by decency.” Here, he drew inspiration from Martin Luther King, Jr., and a leaflet that King addressed to the successful bus boycotters in Montgomery, Alabama. Racial liberals, Kennedy thought, ought to follow King’s example by demonstrating a “majestic forbearance” committed to the long-term pursuit of racial justice. 

Professor Kennedy’s remarks were followed by comments from two distinguished scholars. 

Professor Sanford Levinson, Kennedy’s former undergraduate advisor, used his remarks to ask four questions aimed at clarifying Kennedy’s conception of racial liberalism. 

First: to what extent is the racial liberalism outlined in the lectures an approach to racial justice guided by the realist constraints of the non-ideal world? At times, Levinson pointed out, Kennedy seemed to suggest that racial liberalism’s core sensibilities and approach to political strategy are guided by a concession to the reality of coalition-building in democratic politics. At the same time, Kennedy also seemed to endorse colorblindness as an ideal towards which movements for racial justice ought to strive. Hence, the second, related question: to what extent is racial liberalism an ideal, rather than non-ideal or realist, approach to racial justice?

Third: to what extent does racial liberalism eschew nationalism and, in particular, appeals to patriotism? Given how Kennedy’s remarks about racial justice were grounded in reflection on the American context, Levinson sought to clarify the ways in which nationalism is implicated in Kennedy’s conception of racial liberalism. 

Finally: what does racial liberalism recommend by way of who we choose to commemorate in the pantheon of heroes who fought for racial justice, and how should we choose to remember them? Kennedy valorizes figures who defended non-violent approaches to racial justice, Levinson pointed out, but how should racial liberals think of figures like Nat Turner or that of Frederick Douglass, whose attitude towards non-violence shifted throughout his life?

Professor Olufemi Taiwo used his remarks to press Kennedy on the disavowal of militancy that seemed to be core to racial liberalism’s sensibility. Taiwo began his remarks by pointing out the significant areas of agreement between him and Kennedy: the universal applicability of moral standards, the historical importance of the figures Kennedy associated with racial liberalism, and the ways in which the pursuit of racial justice in the academy could be construed as forms of overreach. 

However, unlike Kennedy, Taiwo does not identify as a racial liberal. Instead, he is a proponent of theories of racial capitalism, according to which racial bias and other forms of racism are best explained by the role they play in supporting a capitalist organization of a society’s political economy. Drawing from joint work with Liam Bright and others describing the socio-political dynamics of racial capitalism, Taiwo argued that militancy is in fact necessary for the pursuit of racial justice. On a racial capitalist view, racial justice is fundamentally about securing a more equitable distribution of resources in a conflictual political arena, rather than about securing the equality of status which Kennedy views as core to his conception of racial liberalism. Kennedy, Taiwo concluded, is too quick to dismiss theories of racial capitalism and the militancy it recommends.

You can watch the lecture recording on Princeton's Media Central website.