ABSTRACT: Theories of epistemic injustice are concerned with injustices in the generation and communication of knowledge, for example when a speaker’s credibility is unjustly deflated or when we lack the concepts with which marginalised groups can describe problematic aspects of their social experience. In this paper, I draw on specific examples, such as the debate about obesity, to consider how the framing of medical and public health issues can create or heighten existing epistemic injustice but also has the potential to alleviate it. Thinking through these issues also strengthens the case for a number of revisions to the concept of epistemic injustice as it is typically understood. 

BIO: Kristin Voigt is an Assistant Professor, jointly appointed in the Institute for Health and Social Policy and the Department of Philosophy. She received her DPhil in political philosophy from the University of Oxford and has held post-doctoral positions at McGill, Harvard, Lancaster University and the European College of Liberal Arts.

Kristin’s research focuses on egalitarian theories of distributive justice and the links between philosophy and social policy. Her recent and ongoing projects address issues such as conceptions and measures of health and health inequality; the use of incentives to improve health outcomes; (childhood) obesity; higher education policy; and smoking and tobacco control.