"The Concept of Ideology Revisited: Origins, Theories, Lived Experience, Political Consequences"

A Workshop under the Auspices of the History of Political Thought Project,
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University

April 27-28, 2012 - 301 Marx Hall
Provisional Schedule and Papers

The workshop starts out from the following general (but eminently contestable) observation: while the word 'ideology' remains discredited in the eyes of many social and political theorists (as well as most intellectual historians), many observers of contemporary political life in fact do write as if they were operating with a concept or perhaps even a theory of ideology. When describing political developments in the West, from the rise of the Tea Party to the expansion of populist politics in Europe, from the challenges faced by the EU to rival attempts to legitimize new forms of global order, analysts often use functional equivalents of 'false consciousness' without actually avowing their underlying assumptions – a practice that might in itself prompt the charge of being 'ideological'. On the other hand, many historians seem now to have become comfortable with concepts such as 'social imaginary', which might also serve as functional equivalents of 'ideology' – and again, one might question to what extent such terms and, where available, underlying theories hold up under closer scrutiny.

Against this background, the workshop aims to engage with questions such as the following:

• Do we have a firm grasp of the conceptual history of ideology? For that matter, do we have a firm grasp on the history of the word 'ideology'?
• Is ideology not just an obviously contested concept, but in fact an essential concept for social theory, if suitably defined or redefined?
• Of course, theories of ideologies have been severely contested and criticized in recent times – for instance in the seminal work of Michael Rosen. What criteria does a successful theory of ideology have to fulfill?
• Should theories of ideology be completely separated from any concerns with cognitive error, dissimulation and deceit? Is there a way to redeem (or at least plausibly reconstruct) Theodor W. Adorno's point that ideologies are always simultaneously both true and false? In what sense precisely do ideologies pose epistemic and normative problems?
• What, if anything, can theorists of ideology learn from empirical findings in social psychology (or even...behavioural economics)?
• Ought there to be a project meaningfully called Ideologiekritik/critique of ideology (as opposed to Richard Rorty's recommendation that 'the best way to expose or demystify an existing practice would seem to be by suggesting an alternative practice, rather than criticizing the current one')?
• What is the relationship – or what ought to be the relationship – between Ideologiekritik and genealogy?
• Political implications (if any)?