Princeton Workshop on Normative Philosophy: The Two Normativities with David Velleman

Mon, Apr 10, 2017, 4:30 pm

J. David Velleman, Professor of Philosophy, New York University 

Abstract: The normativity of requirements and the normativity of reasons are fundamentally different. The meta-ethical problem about the former (posed, for example, in Hume’s argument about ‘is’ and ‘ought’) may be insoluble. The meta-ethical problem about the latter (posed, for example, in Hume’s argument about preferring the destruction of the world to the pricking of his finger) can be solved. The solution yields a purely descriptive meta-ethics, casting doubt on recent claims that the study of normativity belongs to an autonomous realm along with normativity itself.

Pre-reading is not necessary, but for a copy of the paper, email josephcm@princeton.edu.

Location: 
301 Marx Hall